

Expert workshop

*The Conversation Frame:  
Forms and Functions of Fictive Interaction*

Co-organizers: Esther Pascual & Sergeiy Sandler

University of Groningen, 5–6 June 2014

Thurs June 5: Video Conference room (1312-030)

- 8:40–9:00: Walk-in & morning coffee
- 9:00–9:10: Welcoming words – Esther Pascual
- 9:10–10:00: Esther Pascual
  - “Fictive interaction and the conversation frame: An overview”
- 10:00–10:50: Linshuang Yao & Esther Pascual
  - “Screaming evidence and emotional lawyers: Fictive interaction strategies across jurisdictions”
- 10:50–11:10: Coffee break
- 11:10–12:00: Karen Sullivan
  - “Silent abstractions versus “*Look at me*” drawings: Corpus evidence that artworks’ subject matter affects their fictive speech”
- 12:00–12:50: Cristóbal Pagán Cánovas & Mark Turner
  - “Generic Integration Templates for fictive communication”
- 12:50–14:20: Lunch break
- 14:20–15:00: Stef Spronk
  - “Fictive interaction within and beyond the evidential domain”
- 15:10–16:00: Aline Dornelas, Luiz Fernando Matos Rocha & Pablo Arantes
  - “The intonation of fictive interaction constituents vs. actual reported speech counterparts”
- 16:00–16:20: Coffee break
- 16:20–17:10: Lou-Ann Kleppa & Christine Versluis
  - “The use of interactive structures as a communicative strategy in Dutch and Portuguese aphasic speakers”
- 17:10–18:00: Closing discussion (moderator: Sergeiy Sandler)
- 19:00: Dinner

Fri June 6: regular classroom (1312-025)

– 9:00–9:50: Sergeiy Sandler

“Fictive interaction and the nature of linguistic meaning”

– 9:50–10:40: Maria Josep Jarque

“What about? Fictive question-answer pairs for non-information-seeking functions across signed languages”

– 10:40–11:00: Coffee break

– 11:00–11:50: Gusztav Demeter

“On discourse-motivated “sorries”: Fictive apologies in different languages”

– 11:50–12:40: Todd Oakley & William FitzGerald

“Invocation or apostrophe? Prayer and the conversation frame in public discourse”

– 12:40–14:10: Lunch

– 14:10–15:00: Minjian Xiang

“Real, imaginary, or fictive? Philosophical dialogues in an early Daoist text and its pictorial version”

– 15:00–15:50: Line Brandt

“The *you-say-it-you-buy-it* marketing strategy: A theoretical exploration of imagined dialogue”

– 15:50–16:10: Coffee break

– 16:10–17:00: Closing discussion (moderator: Sergeiy Sandler)

–19:00: Dinner

## Abstracts

Thursday, 5 June

### Fictive interaction and the conversation frame: An overview

Esther Pascual, University of Groningen, The Netherlands

This chapter surveys the literature on fictive interaction (Pascual, 2002, 2006a, forthcoming), emphasizing the role of conversation as a cognitive frame. We introduce fictive interaction at different levels: (i) the discourse (conversational monologues, e.g. non-information-seeking questions in written instructions); (ii) discourse content (speech metaphors, e.g. “Paracetamol is the *answer* to headache”); (iii) the inter-sentence level (e.g. “*Any questions? Call our customer service*”); (iv) the sentence (e.g. “*Why bother?*”); (v) the clause (e.g. “They felt, *Oh no!*”); (vi) the phrase (e.g. “the attitude of *yes, I can do it*”); and (vii) the word (e.g. “*forget-me-nots*”). The main questions dealt with are:

1. What forms do conversational constructions take in language structure and use?
2. What are their communicative functions?
3. Are they communicatively effective?

We hope to show that conversational structures: (i) are productive constructions, highly widespread across different language families and modalities; (ii) are frequently used for a great variety of meanings or functions in a wide range of genres and by speakers of different sociolinguistic backgrounds; and (iii) may be used as a communicative strategy by professional as well as by non-professional speakers, including the speech-impaired. We maintain that the very existence of fictive interaction within the sentence, as in direct speech for non-reports, disproves the assumption that direct speech can refer only to communicative acts (e.g. Banfield 1973). Furthermore, the occurrence of the phenomenon in ancient texts and in communities without electricity shows that conversational structures are not restricted to contemporary informal communication in our multimedia era, as commonly assumed (e.g. Fairclough 1994; Streeck 2002). We conclude that there is a conversational basis for cognition, language, and discourse.

We close the chapter with an outline of the entire volume and a summary of the other chapters in it and their contribution to the field.

## **Screaming evidence and emotional lawyers: Fictive interaction strategies across jurisdictions**

Linshuang Yao, Huazhong University of Science and Technology, China

Esther Pascual, University of Groningen, The Netherlands

This chapter deals with fictive interaction (Pascual 2002, 2006b) used to express and arouse emotions in criminal procedures from five different countries. We will compare legal discourses in murder and homicide cases from different jurisdictions, with: (i) a folk jury (United States, Spain); (ii) professional judges (the Netherlands, China); and (iii) a folk jury and professional judges (Belgium). The focus is on the use of the conversation frame in: (i) fictive conversations with silent individuals in and outside the courtroom; (ii) fictive enunciations defining non-conversational entities or processes; and (iii) the “speech” of material evidence, the deceased victim, or her corpse.

Preliminary analysis reveals similarities in argumentation and narration through: (i) fictive interaction with the silent evaluators, the adversary, and/or absent parties through expository and rhetorical questions (Pascual 1999, 2006a); (ii) fictive enunciations construing attitudes, legal terms and decisions; and (iii) material evidence presented as “speaking”. Differences seem to lie primarily in the most dramatic and creative manifestations. Whereas material evidence may appear as “telling” throughout, its emotional presentation as “not *lying*” was only observed before the American and Belgian jury (Coulson & Pascual 2006, Pascual 2008a, 2008b). Also, we only found the deceased victim or her corpse being given voice in the American data, although the victim appeared as speaking through the prosecutor in one Spanish jury trial (Pascual 1998, forth).

We conclude that: (i) fictive interaction may be used as an emotional argumentative and narrative strategy in different languages, cultures and judicial systems; and (ii) its frequency of occurrence, type and linguistic form depends on the factual interactional structure, cultural takes on dramatization, and language-specific features. The chapter is based on ethnographic data and the study of legal files from numerous cases (Yao 2012; Pascual in press).

## **Silent abstractions versus “*Look at me*” drawings: Corpus evidence that artworks’ subject matter affects their fictive speech**

Karen Sullivan, University of Queensland, Australia

An interesting artwork can be said to “speak” to its viewers. This metaphoric “speech” is a form of fictive interaction (Pascual 2002). The current study indicates that the way art “speaks” depends on its subject matter. It has been observed that purely abstract artworks usually “speak” to their creators, whereas figurative works (depicting people, objects or landscapes) mostly “speak” to their viewers (Sullivan 2006, 2009). The present study finds that abstract artworks not only “speak” to fewer people, but are less capable of direct speech than figurative artworks. On the other hand, drawings and paintings of named characters are found to participate in fictive conversations not shared by other works.

In a corpus of 1,105 examples of fictive interaction from the “DeviantART” website, 79 figurative works “speak” directly, such as when a drawing “says ‘*hey, I’m alive*” or “screams ‘*WTF*””. However, only one abstract work “speaks” directly. Three reasons are suggested for this disparity. First, subject matter in figurative works often “speaks” directly, such as when a fairy “says”, “*I will have my revenge*”. Purely abstract works lack subjects that can “speak”. Second, artworks frequently “speak” as mediums of communication, as in a “‘*thank you*’ drawing” (Pascual forthcoming). However, no abstract artworks in the corpus were created for other people. Third, figurative works reference popular culture, such as when a painting “screams ‘*<300>*” (a movie title) or “screams ‘*elf*” (a fictional species). No abstract art referenced existing creative works in this manner.

However, portraits of named characters participated in a wider range of interactions than other works. Only named characters were “introduced” to their viewers, and artists issued “commands” or “questions” only to these works.

In sum, artworks’ subject matter affects not only its “conversational partners” (Sullivan 2009), but also influences the type of “speech” that artworks may produce.

## **Generic Integration Templates for fictive communication**

Cristóbal Pagán Cánovas, University of Navarra, Spain

Mark Turner, Case Western Reserve University, USA

Human beings are extremely good at mixing the present situation with an exchange from the past, reporting past communicative events, or interacting in fictional scenarios. *Fictive communication* (Coulson & Pascual 2006; Pascual 2002, 2006a) is one of the clearest examples of our advanced capacities for conceptual integration, or blending (Fauconnier & Turner 2002), the higher-order cognitive capacity that allows us to integrate disparate elements into novel, meaningful conceptual wholes. Although every instance of blending might look extremely creative and unique, there are generic, recurrent patterns of integration (Fauconnier 2009; Turner 2014; Pagán Cánovas 2010). These patterns can be transmitted by culture, and mastering them allows us to be fast and efficient in performing individual *conceptual blends*. Two decades of research into conceptual integration have exposed an impressive number of “Generic Integration Templates” (GITs), that is, generic integration networks that are not in themselves full and specific integration networks or expressed as such, but that operate as established patterns used to inform specific integration networks.

This article analyzes how fictive communication is made possible by GITs. First we examine the basic templates for fictive interaction, and then we move to the more specific patterns for building fictive communication through the integration of one or more mental spaces with the frame of the Conversation (Pascual 2008). We distinguish a variety of GITs that intervene in the process, with different possible outcomes: no interaction in the inputs but only in the blend, interaction in the inputs with an emergent, meaningful interaction in the blend, splitting the self to create fictive conversations, etc. By situating fictive communication within a theory of GITs, we can more easily point at the particularities of conceptual integration in discourse, as opposed to non-discursive cognitive activity.

## Fictive interaction within and beyond the evidential domain

Stef Spronk, Australian National University

Reported speech (quotation) is an evidential strategy. In constructing an utterance such as:

(1) 'John said: "There is still hope"'

the current speaker invokes a discourse situation previous to the current discourse situation involving the reported speaker John and the reported message. Whether the reported message is relevant at the speech moment depends on the way in which the reported speech situation and its participants relate to the current speech situation. This opposition of two discourse events is the defining feature the grammatical category of evidentiality. In deciding whether John's hopeful assessment in (1) is still relevant at the speech moment and for the discourse participants involved, interpreting the evidential meaning is key.

Typologically, languages have been found to use direct speech constructions mostly for functions that include an evidential meaning but in exceptional --but not uncommon-- cases, examples have been attested of direct speech constructions being used for functions beyond the evidential domain. Functions of direct speech constructions that include an evidential meaning are those that involve some attribution of speech, thought or intentions to some discourse participant other than the current speaker at the present time and place. A language that uses one single construction to express all three of these functions is the Australian Aboriginal language Ungarinyin. Attested functions of direct speech constructions that do not include an evidential meaning have been as diverse as 'causality' (voice), 'lest' (modality), 'beginning of the action' (aspect), 'future' (tense) and others. The Usan example in (2) illustrates the second of these functions:

(2) mi qei-qei mani umer-iner qamb gitab ig-oun  
thing some-RED yam wilt-3s:UF say:SS abstain:SS be-1p:PR  
'We abstain from various things lest the yams wilt' (Reesink, 1993: 222)

In this paper I begin by sketching the relevant evidential meanings that may be expressed through direct speech constructions based on newly collected fieldwork data of Ungarinyin. I then demonstrate how the *absence* of evidential meanings in direct speech constructions may

show up in distinct patterns of discourse reference in texts, based on examples of ‘non-evidential’ fictive interaction. Since ‘evidential’ fictive interaction (such as in Ungarinyin) involves two opposed discourse situations with their own inherent time, place and participants, reference to these discourse participants, places and times displays two separate patterns: that of the current speech situation and that of the reported speech situation. In non-evidential fictive interaction this distinction is absent, which is reflected in the discourse status of the discourse participants referred to in a construction as in (2).

After identifying these distinct patterns of discourse reference between evidential and non-evidential fictive interaction in Ungarinyin and Usan I demonstrate how these patterns may be used to discover examples of (grammaticalising) non-evidential fictive interaction in European languages, based on a corpus of Russian texts.

### **The intonation of fictive interaction constituents vs. actual reported speech counterparts**

Luiz Fernando Matos Rocha, Federal University of Juiz de Fora, Brazil

Pablo Arantes, Federal University of São Carlos, Brazil

Aline Dornelas, Federal University of Juiz de Fora, Brazil

This chapter aims to address the relevance of prosodic features structured by the conversation frame, especially the ones concerning embedded fictive interaction (Pascual 2002, 2006). It investigates how prosodic aspects contribute to the recognition of embedded FI as a virtual instance of direct speech in a Brazilian Portuguese oral corpus.

The construction under study is “(EU) FALEI + CLAUSE” (I SAID + CLAUSE), which can be interpreted either fictively or factively (Rocha 2006, 2013a, b). We used PRAAT, a software for the analysis of speech in phonetics, to analyze 20 recorded examples of the use of this construction (10 fictive and 10 factive), and, according to preliminary results, factive interactions have greater fundamental frequency (F0) mean, standard deviation and range than fictive ones. No differences in overall contour shape were observed. These findings may contribute to the hypothesis that these distinct vocal construals, related to the same construction, point out different cognitive frames in the flow of discourse: the fictive interpretation is linked to the evaluation frame, i.e., given a set of evidence one comes to believe something is going to be/is the case; while a factive interpretation is related to the



speech communication frame, i.e., reported utterances indicate that one is committed to the factuality of the event.

Discursive context clues adjacent to FI such as epistemic verbs can prompt a fictive reading of such a pattern at a semantic level. On the other hand, prosodic analysis can unveil enunciative dimensions of fictivity as a linguistic construction organized by the conversation frame whose components also depend on the suprasegmental level. Thus, prosodic aspects are an important feature for distinguishing how the conceptualizer interprets such construction as fictive or factive. This may contribute to analyzing the gradual content of fictivity in utterances across languages.

### **The use of interactive structures as a communicative strategy in Dutch and Portuguese aphasic speakers**

Christine Versluis, VU University Amsterdam, The Netherlands

Lou-Ann Kleppa, Federal University of Santa Maria, Brazil

This study addresses strategic speech styles in brain-damaged speakers with good comprehension skills but limited resources for speech production. Strategic behavior in these speakers is seen to comprise highly frequent use of elliptical repertoire in response to a reduced attention window for syntactic information (Kolk 1995; Kolk and Van Grunsven 1985). We focus on varieties of elliptical form that indicate a conceptual strategy underlying agrammatic outcomes in aphasia. Our data-driven, qualitative analysis of conversations with two Brazilian and two Dutch aphasic participants shows a great deal of ellipsis organized by fictive interaction (Pascual 2002, 2006a), including direct speech, onomatopoeia and mimicry. We identified three communicative functions of the fictive interaction structure.

#### 1) Re-enactment of past events

MS (Looks up submissively, frowns forehead) Bicicléta!

*Bicycle!*

(Straightens body, shakes head, assumes grave tone) NÃO! Rólógio!

*No, watch!*

[When I was a child I begged for a bicycle but my parents gave me a watch]

2) Rhetoric

R En “Tadaa!” Hallo!

*And “Tadaa!” Hello!*

[after stroke, being isolated, possibly dying and unable to call for help, I was found: Stereotype making an appearance, evaluates point of story: ‘I thought I was lost but then I still got back on stage’]

3) Modelling grammatical relations

MS Muito calor? À noite.

*Very hot? At night.*

[conditionality: If it is hot, (I walk) at night]

All subjects used fictive interaction on its own as well as in conjunction with Topic Comment organization both in sentence-level and text-level combinations. They demonstrated a controlled use of interactive structure in support of current referential and rhetorical values. These findings suggest that participants in this study use a speech style that strategically draws on and exploits a shared conceptual frame of reference and particularly a shared model of interactive knowledge and action.

## Friday, 6 June

### Fictive interaction and the nature of linguistic meaning

Sergeiy Sandler, University of Groningen, The Netherlands

In this talk, I consider the repercussions that the phenomenon of fictive interaction has on basic questions of how language and meaning should be conceived.

One may distinguish (following Voloshinov, 1986) between three broad conceptions of linguistic meaning. One conception, which I will call “logical”, views meaning as given in reference (for words) and truth (for sentences). This approach attributes meaning to linguistic expressions in themselves and their relation to the world, essentially bypassing human consciousness. Another conception, the “monological” one, seeks meaning in the cognitive capacities of the individual, identifying it with the speaker’s expressive intentions or with the speakers and/or listener’s conceptualization of an utterance’s content. A third, “dialogical”, conception of meaning, anchored in intersubjectivity-based approaches, attributes meaning to interaction between individuals and personal perspectives (e.g. Linell 1998; Pascual 2002,

forthcoming; Verhagen 2005; Zlatev et al. 2008). This view finds the meaning of an utterance in how it is responded to (Bakhtin [1979] 1986; Sacks 1992), and examines the content of utterances through the dialogue embedded within them (Bakhtin [1963] 1984, [1979] 1986).

In this talk I directly contrast how well these three approaches to meaning would deal with the phenomenon of fictive interaction. I consider possible logical, monological, and dialogical accounts, and argue that only in a dialogical framework can a properly motivated and workable account for the use of the conversation frame in discourse (Pascual 2002, 2008, forthcoming) be provided.

### **What about? Fictive question-answer pairs for non-information-seeking functions across signed languages**

Maria Josep Jarque, University of Barcelona, Spain, & University of Groningen

The central question addressed in this chapter is: how is the basic interactional pattern of turn-taking reflected in grammatical structure? Specifically, I deal with the grammaticalized question-answer pattern, which constitutes a prototypical conversational structure. Many languages accept the occurrence of the question(-answer) pattern as a rhetorical device or marker of information structure (Haiman 1978; Li & Thomson 1976, see overview in: Pascual forth). In signed languages, the question-answer pattern often serves to set up a fictive kind of interaction to express grammatical or discursive meaning.

Here I examine the grammaticalized occurrence of polar and content questions and their subsequent answers for the expression of non-information-seeking functions in signed languages. The focus is on conditionals, topics, and connectives (consecutives, finals, and causals), which all show formal similarities with interrogatives, especially eyebrow raise (Coerts 1992; Janzen 1999; Johnston & Schembri 2007, *inter alia*). For instance, in Jordanian Sign Language the sentence ‘If it rains tomorrow, there will be no trip’ is literally produced as “*Tomorrow rain? There will be no trip*” (Hendricks 2008). Similarly, in Finnish Sign Language, the sentence ‘The capital of Iceland is Reykjavik’ is construed as a topic construction with an interactional structure: “*Iceland? Its capital is Reykjavik*” (Jantunen 2007). The question-answer structure is also used for the connective function as in the following Catalan Sign Language example (literally): “But there is a negative side. *Which negative side? The one concerning mass media*”.

I compare these structures in long-established signed languages, such as those mentioned above, and in recently emerged signed languages, such as Al-Sayyid Bedouin Sign Language (ABSL) and Nicaraguan Sign Language (ISN). This study is based on cross-linguistic data involving 35 signed languages from different families, enriched with a qualitative analysis of data from Catalan Sign Language (from television newscasts to everyday conversations).

### **On discourse-motivated “sorries”: Fictive apologies in different languages**

Gusztav Demeter, Case Western Reserve University, USA

Traditional approaches to the study of conversation imply that all participants are present in the interaction. However, cognitive approaches to discourse have shown that participants are not always actual, but can also be virtual (Langacker 1999; Talmy 1996), and can therefore participate in fictive interaction (Pascual 2002, 2006). In line with such approaches, speech acts can also occur in fictive interaction as fictive speech acts (Demeter 2011; Pascual 2002, forth). The aim of this chapter is to investigate the forms and functions of fictive apologies as manifestations of fictive interaction in different languages.

The speech act that will be examined in this chapter is the apology. The forms and functions of fictive apologies will be analyzed using extensive examples from both spoken and written corpora in several languages, including, but not limited to, English, Romanian, and Hungarian. To illustrate the phenomenon of a fictive apology, consider this example from an editorial on environmental issues published before a world climate conference in 2009: “Hansen and his team have shown that we could actually burn most of the oil in our wells (*but sorry Canada, not the tar sands*)” (Davies 2008). In this example, the apology is addressed to Canada, which is not an actual participant in the conversation between the writer and the reader, but rather a fictive one. In turn, the reader becomes what Goffman (1963) termed a bystander. Both the pragmatic offense and the apology are therefore fictive, as well. Such fictive apologies usually have additional metadiscursive functions, such as irony in the example above.

This is the first extended study of fictive apologies, which typically involve a role shift between addressee and bystander. This chapter contributes to a more integrated account of how the conversation frame is construed.

## **Invocation or apostrophe? Prayer and the conversation frame in public discourse**

William FitzGerald, Rutgers University Camden, United Kingdom

Todd Oakley, Case Western Reserve University, USA

Prayer is a special kind of rhetorical performance, whose sanctioned listener is a divine agent. But prayer is also a pervasive performance of appeal and invocation operating in secular public discourse. Sustained inquiry into prayer as at once special and pervasive has received scant attention outside theology, with two notable exceptions: Kenneth Burke's (1961) *Rhetoric of Religion* and William FitzGerald's (2012) *Spiritual Modalities*. Burke and FitzGerald approach prayer as a rhetorical phenomenon, one that manifests motives of scene, act, and attitude—three dimensions of Burke's "dramatistic" pentad, a mode of analysis for understanding "why people do what they do".

Close examination of speech events reveals a dynamic interaction between these motives, analyzable as relations between dimensions. In canonical prayer, for example, the situation or "scene" is predisposed for an "act" of prayer. It exhibits a "scene–act" relation. But in many instances, the "scene" is not so predisposed; instead, the "act" of prayer is part of a secular discourse. It exhibits an "act–scene" relation.

Prayer, then, is a natural addition to work on fictive interaction, the notion that the scene of conversation is a pervasive representational resource for framing all manner of situations in terms of one person talking to another (cf. Pascual 2002, 2006). Our empirical aim is to examine several instances of prayerful language from a corpus of news broadcasts. We will focus on three phrases (with minor variations) indicative of either a full invocation of the divine as a sanctioned addressee or as a more "fossilized" apostrophic act of reference to the divine as eavesdropper, or as Bakhtin's "superaddressee". We will study instances of let us pray; lord have mercy; and god be praised, each of which turned up with multiple hits in the Little Red Hen database as both instances of invocation or apostrophe. We contend that invocation and apostrophe access the same conversational frame but with different dimensions of address. These findings, we argue, provide an opportune moment for putting current work on fictive interaction into productive dialogue with classical and modern rhetorical theories.

## **Real, imaginary, or fictive? Philosophical dialogues in an early Daoist text and its pictorial version**

Mingjian Xiang, Zhejiang University, China

This chapter deals with fictive interaction imagery in a foundational text of Daoism, *Zhuangzi* (4th century B.C.), and its two-volume comic book rendition, *Zhuangzi Speaks* (Tsai 2005). The comic book faithfully reproduces the original text, adding to it a multimodal representation in the interrelated panels of the comic books (cf. Narayan 2001).

The *Zhuangzi* text is replete with small dialogues between real historical or contemporary figures as well as entirely fictitious characters, deities or personified animals and plants (Ning 2008; Xiang & Pascual under review). Even when involving actual individuals, these dialogues are all imaginary, since they never happened (Lu 1981). The philosopher splits himself into two selves, assuming the role of fictive addresser (e.g. a River God) and fictive addressee (e.g. a Sea God). The philosopher thus fictively talks to himself through other characters in a kind of ventriloquism (Tannen 2004; Cooren 2010, 2012), the reader becoming a bystander (Goffman 1963) of this fictive conversation on the philosopher's insights into human nature and the universe. This is pictorially reflected in the first and last panel of each strip in the comic book version, which always depict Zhuangzi. Hence, readers understand the moral of the narrative through both fiction and fictivity. Even though the exchange is fictional, it is still structured by the conversation frame (the philosopher speaking through the conversing characters and we readers as bystanders fictively interacting with them), and so it exhibits fictivity. The overall configuration is licensed by the conventional integration of writing and reading as a simultaneous conversation (Herman 1999; Fauconnier & Turner 2002).

This study confirms Brandt's (2008, 2013) view that fictive interaction configurations are a standard argumentative strategy in philosophical texts, as also instantiated in Plato's Dialogues (Kahn 1996; Wang 2013). I also hope to show that fictivity and fiction form a continuum, rather than a clear-cut distinction with prototypical and peripheral members.

## **The *you-say-it-you-buy-it* marketing strategy: A theoretical exploration of imagined dialogue**

Line Brandt, Copenhagen Business School, Denmark

The *conversation frame* is argued here to be rightly recognized as a basic resource in human cognition (Brandt 2013). One phenomenon illustrating this is the employment of “fictive (verbal) interaction” (Pascual 2002) in natural discourse. Fictive interaction reveals the ubiquity of non-genuine quotes in planned as well as spontaneous discourse, providing evidence for its grammatical status. To further develop the theory, I introduced some technical distinctions (Brandt 2008, 2010, 2013), among these two overall types of what I call “imagined dialogue”. One type primarily involves conceptual integration (e.g. the Debate with Kant, Fauconnier & Turner 1996, 1998); the other concerns utterances functioning as grammatical constituents (e.g. “*I do!* ring”). Since the latter form is embedded in the matrix speech event and relies on *metonymic* reference (Pascual 2006a, Pascual et al. 2013), this type is characterized as ‘embedded metonymic enunciation’. This, in turn, is defined by the imagined presence of either a specific speech situation (“fictive interaction”) or a *generically* represented situation of address (“generic interaction”).

This chapter elaborates on these theoretical advances by examining imagined dialogue in discourse designed for the specific purpose of promoting a particular agenda or commercial product. In so doing, it furthermore explores the grammatical aspect of the examined embedded metonymies. So far excluded from the prescriptive grammars of languages, embedded imagined utterances may in fact participate in grammatical structures as “parts of speech”, in English typically as nouns, verbs or adjectives, functioning as heads or modifiers in syntactic phrases (Pascual 2002, Pascual et al 2013). The overall aims of this chapter are: (i) to provide empirical support from strategically motivated discourse for Pascual’s fundamental discovery that fictive *conversational turns* can function as parts of speech; and (ii) to stipulate a hypothesis concerning the strategic motivation for the use of imagined dialogue in marketing.